Security

Armed Forces Overview

Under the constitution, the president is commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia—FAC), which consists of the army (Ejército Nacional); navy (Armada Nacional), including naval aviation, marines, and coast guard; air force (Fuerza Aérea Colombiana); and paramilitary National Police (Policía Nacional—PN). The civilian-led Ministry of National Defense is responsible for internal and external security and oversees the armed forces. It also has organizational control over the National Police. In practice, however, the president exercises direct command over the military and the police, leaving the minister of defense with only administrative duties. The commanders of the three services (army, navy, and air force) are responsible to the commander general of the armed forces, who reports directly to the Ministry of Defense. The Superior Council of Defense and Security (Consejo Superior de Defensa y Seguridad—CSDS) and the Security Council advise the president. The FAC is responsible for maintaining order and security in rural areas and supports the PN in urban areas when called upon. In 2005 the active armed forces totaled 209,000, including 74,700 conscripts. The armed forces strength by service was as follows: army 180,000, including 63,800 conscripts; navy 22,000, including 100 naval aviation, 14,000 marines, and 7,000 conscripts; and air force 7,000, including some 3,900 conscripts. Reservists totaled an additional 238,700 (army, 232,700; navy, 4,800; and air force, 1,200).

Foreign Military Relations

Since the late 1980s, the United States has been the primary provider of military training and equipment to Colombia. Other important suppliers have included Brazil, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, and Israel. Many Colombian military personnel have received training in the United States or U.S. training in Colombia; the United States has provided equipment to the Colombian military and police through the military assistance program, foreign military sales program, and international narcotics control program. In 1999–2001 the U.S. government approved a US$1.3 billion aid package called Plan Colombia, most of which was earmarked for military hardware for antidrug efforts, such as a fleet of 71 helicopters for spraying coca fields. In March 2002, in response to a request from President George W. Bush, the U.S. Congress lifted restrictions on U.S. assistance to Colombia to allow it to be used for counterinsurgency in addition to antidrug operations. U.S. support for Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts included slightly more than US$2.5 billion in aid between 2000 and 2004, making Colombia the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid, after Israel and Egypt. Although Plan Colombia ended in 2005, the United States has continued funding it with aid for counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts averaging US$600 million per year through 2007.

U.S. military aid is devoted primarily to training units of the Special Forces and Rapid Deployment Force. The “cap” on U.S. troops and contractors in Colombia was raised in October 2004 from about 320 U.S. military trainers and 400 U.S. civilian contractors to 800 military personnel and 600 civilian contractors. These U.S. personnel help the Colombian armed forces to develop commando squads dedicated to capturing or killing rebel commanders. With U.S. assistance, President Uribe has been attempting to make the armed forces more professional, to build a countrywide civilian informant network, and to try to involve the civilian population in his Democratic Security and Defense Policy.

External Threat

Colombia does not face any known foreign threats. Venezuela is the only neighbor that might pose a potential military challenge over as-yet unresolved territorial disputes relating to the maritime boundary, where there may be oilfields. The largely state-controlled Venezuelan media portray Colombia as an external aggressor with U.S. backing. However, since the two nations concluded a bilateral free-trade agreement in 1991, Colombia and Venezuela have not allowed the occasional security incidents involving Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries along their long common border to escalate into a serious issue.

Defense Budget

As a result of U.S. aid under Plan Colombia, the defense budget, as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), expanded during the 2000–6 period from 3.2 percent of GDP in 2000 to 6 percent of GDP in 2006. In dollar terms, estimates for the defense budget for 2006 ranged from US$4.1 billion to nearly US$4.5 billion. President Uribe’s defense budget increases have gone toward expanding the armed forces, mainly the number of professional soldiers and counterguerrilla battalions.

Major Military Units

The army is organized into six divisions consisting of 17 brigades (six mechanized, two air-portable, and nine infantry), the Army Aviation Brigade, the Antinarcotics Brigade, the Special Forces Brigade, the Training Brigade, and two artillery battalions. The infantry includes 47 infantry battalions—four air-transportable, three antinarcotics, one ceremonial, 22 counterinsurgency, five high-mountain, four jungle, three mechanized, four military police, and one special forces. Armor consists of nine cavalry groups, including one air-transportable; artillery, nine battalions, including one air defense; engineers, 10 battalions; and logistics, 15 battalions. The navy is organized into four fleet commands (including five marine battalions), a coast guard, and a naval air arm. The 14,000-member Colombian Marine Corps is organized into a single division with two brigades (one amphibious assault brigade and one riverine brigade), each with two battalions. The air force is organized into four functional commands: combat, transport, training, and logistical support. The Combat Air Command includes six combat groups—two fighter squadrons, a tactical air support command, a utility/armed helicopter command, a military air transport command, and an air training command.

Major Military Equipment

The army inventory includes 12 light tanks, 182 reconnaissance vehicles, about 200 armored personnel carriers, 20 antitank guided weapons, and about 100 helicopters. The navy has four submarines, eight principal surface combatants, 27 patrol and coastal combatants, five offshore patrol vessels, nine coastal/inshore patrol vessels, and 13 riverine patrol boats. The navy inventory also includes at least three Orca-class fast intercept craft and three sail training ships. The air force inventory includes 57 combat aircraft and 23 armed helicopters. In 2006 the air force signed for 25 Brazilian Embraer EMB–314 Super Tucano light attack aircraft and took delivery of the first five in December. The air force’s fleet of Israel Aerospace Industries Kfir C2s and C7s and Dassault Aviation Mirage 5 COAs and CODs, which have been in service more than 30 years, need to be upgraded or replaced. The paramilitary National Police force has 28 aircraft and 10 helicopters.

Military Service

Under the 1991 constitution, all nonstudent males reaching the age of 18 must present themselves for military service of one to two years (normally 24 months). However, those from well-off families can buy their way out of serving, and those with high-school diplomas are exempt from combat. In effect, mostly the poor with little education actually serve. After completing active service, conscripts become part of the reserves. In 2005 an estimated 389,735 males aged 18 to 49 reached military service age. In this age-group, a total of 10,212,456 males were available for military service, and an estimated 6,986,228 were deemed fit for military service. As of 1993, females may volunteer for military service, which could be required if warranted by circumstances. In 2005 an estimated 383,146 females aged 18 to 49 reached military service age. In this age--group, 10,561,562 females were available for military service, and an estimated 8,794,465 were deemed fit for military service.

Military Forces Abroad

Colombia has one infantry battalion in Egypt in support of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), an independent international peacekeeping organization established by Egypt and Israel to monitor the security arrangements of their 1979 Treaty of Peace. The paramilitary National Police deployed personnel to serve with United Nations peacekeeping forces in Croatia and El Salvador.

Security Forces

In 2005 the security forces totaled 129,000 personnel, including 121,000 members of the paramilitary National Police (Policía Nacional—PN) and 8,000 members of the rural militia. Although the PN and the military forces are formally independent institutions, with their own budgets and personnel, the PN is organizationally subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. In addition to supporting the army in its internal security role, the PN shares law enforcement duties, with the exception of investigative functions, with the Administrative Department of Security (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad—DAS) and the Attorney General’s Technical Investigation Corps (Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación—CTI). The highly trained Groups of Unified Action for Personal Freedom (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal—Gaula) have long enjoyed U.S. support and have a fleet of Blackhawk helicopters and aircraft for the tasks of drug crop eradication and antikidnapping and urban hostage-rescue operations. One of Colombia’s most effective counternarcotics forces, the 200-member Directorate of the Judicial Police and Investigation (Dirección de Policía Judicial e Investigación—DIJIN) is a U.S.-trained and -funded force. Under the January 2007 reorganization of the National Police, the DIJIN was renamed the Criminal Investigation Directorate (Dirección de Investigación Criminal—DIC).

Internal Threat

Colombia’s principal internal threats are posed by illegal armed organizations, mainly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC), but also paramilitary groups and narcotics-trafficking syndicates. These organizations cannot be neatly separated because the insurgent and paramilitary groups are heavily involved in the illegal narcotics trade, and the narcotics traffickers have been known to use the guns-for-hire services of the paramilitaries. Although the country’s largest paramilitary organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia—AUC), was formally demobilized in 2006, basically on its own terms, critics complained that many of the demobilized “paramilitaries” proved to be common criminals taking advantage of the lenient amnesty to clean their records. Even after having won immunity from prosecution from previous crimes, many reportedly have continued their illegal operations by simply being recycled into new paramilitary groups or signing up to staff the armed wings of the drug traffickers. In August 2006, an estimated 2,000 paramilitaries belonged to other groups that have remained outside the peace process altogether.The main guerrilla organizations that continue to be active are the FARC, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN), and the much smaller People’s Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Popular—EPL). The FARC is the best-equipped, -trained, and -organized guerrilla force in Latin America and poses the primary insurgency threat to the Colombian government. It has an estimated 16,000 active rural combatants and between 4,000 and 5,000 urban militants. The ELN, with an estimated 3,200 members plus an urban militia of undetermined size, continues to be a significant threat, specializing in economic sabotage, particularly of the oil industry but also the transportation and communications infrastructure. The EPL has an estimated 300 members.

The Uribe government has rejected guerrilla demands for prisoner exchanges and demilitarized zones as a precondition for peace talks. After repeated efforts to initiate a peace process with the FARC failed, the Uribe government, with the support of the United States under Plan Colombia, sought a more confrontational approach through a sustained military offensive against the FARC in its rural strongholds. It is generally believed that the left-wing guerrillas have little chance of taking power in Colombia. Nevertheless, the FARC and ELN remain well funded and well equipped and are capable of carrying out effective guerrilla attacks against the military and security forces, as well as occasional acts of urban terrorism in Bogotá. The FARC’s failure to disrupt the presidential election of May 2006 demonstrated that it lacks the military capacity to destabilize much less overthrow the government. Nevertheless, the continuing stalemate also has shown that the government lacks the ability to defeat the FARC through military means.

In contrast with the FARC, the more politically inclined ELN has agreed to meet government representatives, such as in Havana, Cuba, in December 2005, to discuss the possibility of a peace process. As a result, more serious negotiations between the ELN and the Uribe government were expected to be held during President Uribe’s second term. On October 26, 2006, after several rounds of exploratory talks in Havana, the Colombian government and the ELN announced the start of formal peace negotiations to take place in November and December 2006.

According to Colombian government figures, at least 2,387 guerrillas (1,558 FARC members and 359 ELN members) and 470 AUC members deserted their respective organizations in 2006 under Colombia’s program to rehabilitate former combatants. The deserters included 384 minors and 425 women. As of the end of 2006, 11,264 irregulars had laid down their arms on an individual basis since President Uribe took office in August 2002.

In addition to the aforementioned insurgent and paramilitary threats, violent crime by common criminals is rampant in Colombia’s major cities and often carried out with impunity. Homicide levels are among the highest in the world, fueled by high unemployment, growing poverty, the ready availability of guns, and the growth of drug trafficking and organized crime. Unlike the guerrilla groups, the narcotics traffickers are more active in urban areas, spawning many homicides among competing groups. Criminal bands specializing in kidnapping, extortion, and robbery target businesses and civilians. Kidnapping exceeded a record 3,700 reported cases in 2000; guerrilla and paramilitary groups were responsible for about three-quarters of them. According to the Ministry of Defense, in 2006 the number of kidnapping cases totaled 249, compared with 376 in 2005. In addition to improved law enforcement, the decline resulted from the government’s offensive against the guerrillas and the demobilization of many paramilitaries. Approximately the same number of kidnappings (800) were reported in 2005. Guerrilla and paramilitary groups may still be responsible for more than two-thirds of kidnappings; organized crime, for about one-third. The most vulnerable targets are campesinos and local businessmen. The insurgency has left much of the Colombian countryside planted with guerrilla landmines, which killed 1,100 people in the year ending in June 2006, the highest landmine casualty rate in the world. Although most of the casualties are soldiers, 30 percent are civilians, almost all of them campesinos.

After drug trafficking, the main illicit industries are contraband, forgery (principally of clothing, books, CDs, and audio- and video-cassettes), and, more recently, theft of gasoline. Contraband is a major industry. A significant amount of foreign exchange is believed to be from illegal trade in gold and emeralds, in addition to drugs. In 1999 the value of contraband in Colombia increased to US$2.2 billion, more than doubling in a decade. The amount accounted for about 25 percent of total imports and 50 percent of total exports. According to a study by the U.S. Treasury Department, Colombia and North Korea are the largest producers of counterfeit U.S. banknotes, and Colombia is also the number-one source of counterfeit money in the United States, accounting for about 15 percent of the 56.2 million counterfeit dollars in circulation in 2005.

Narcotics Production and Trafficking

Other than kidnapping and extortion, the principal activities of organized crime and the armed groups in Colombia are narcotics production and trafficking, mainly of cocaine and heroin, and these activities also have involved the guerrilla and paramilitary forces. Trafficking in processed cocaine and other illicit drugs accounts for more than US$5 billion a year and represents between 2.0 percent and 2.5 percent of gross domestic product a year. Only an estimated half of these illicit revenues return to Colombia. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN) control all aspects of the drug trade in their areas of influence. For example, they levy taxes at all levels of the narcotics production chain. Since 2004 many Colombian drug traffickers have been joining or buying their way into the paramilitary militias in order to qualify for an immunity program.

Latin America’s largest exporter of illegal drugs, Colombia is the world’s leading coca cultivator and supplier of refined cocaine. More than 90 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States is produced, processed, or transshipped in Colombia. The country is also a growing source for heroin. Although opium poppy cultivation fell 50 percent to 2,100 hectares between 2003 and 2004, it yielded a potential 3.8 metric tons of pure heroin, mostly for the U.S. market. Despite tactical successes (such as the dismantling of the big cartels in the 1980s), large amounts of U.S. military and financial support for the government’s war on drugs, and an active aerial eradication program, coca cultivation more than doubled between 1995 and 1999. Increased aerial spraying under Plan Colombia reduced the coca-growing area under cultivation by one-half between 2001 and 2004, but aggressive replanting allowed this area to expand in 2005. As much coca reportedly was being cultivated in Colombia in 2006 as when aerial spraying of the drug crop began in 2000. Coca cultivating simply has been redistributed into smaller, harder-to-reach crops. For these reasons, an investigative report published in the New York Times in August 2006 described the US$4.7 billion Plan Colombia as a failure, pointing out that, despite counternarcotics efforts since the mid-1980s, the supply of cocaine on U.S. streets has remained virtually unchanged, prices have fallen, and purity has increased.

Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Country Profile: Colombia, February 2007